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Part Ill: A Critique 
By Steven P. Zell 
F 
our  decades  after  its  creation,  the 
Federal-state system of unemployment 
insurance  (UI)  remains  one  of  our  nation's 
principal  tools  for  economic  stabilization.  As 
has been seen in Parts I and  I1  of  this series, 
the UI system has evolved  into an enormously 
complex and varied organization. ' Almost every 
facet of the system has expanded tremendously. 
For example, since the mid-1950's, the number 
of covered workers has grown far more rapidly 
than the total work force, the level of  average 
weekly  benefits  adjusted  for  inflation  has 
increased  almost  twice  as fast as  real  average 
spendable  weekly  earnings,  and  the  potential 
duration of benefits has been expanded from 26 
weeks to 65 weeks. 
In  recent  years,  economists  have  become 
extremely interested  in  the potential impact of 
these  changes  on  the level  of  unemployment. 
Since  the  earnings  a  worker  foregoes  while 
unemployed  can  be  thought of  as the cost  of 
1  Parts  I  and  11 appeared,  respectively,  in  the  February 
1976 and June 1976 issues of this Revrew. 
2 For one estimate of these changes from 1955 to 1973, see 
George M. von  Furstenberg,  "Stabilization  Characteristics 
of Unemployment Insurance." unpublished  paper, Council 
ot  Economic Advisors, p. 5. 
that unemployment,  economic  theory  predicts 
that  as  this  cost  is  reduced  via  liberalized 
unemployment benefits, the level  of  unemploy- 
ment  in  the  economy  might  increase. 
Considerable  research  has  been  conducted  on 
the nature and magnitude of these unintended 
effects  of  the  UI  program,  often  with 
conflicting  results.  This  concluding  article on 
unemployment insurance will  examine some of 
the  major  criticisms  of  the  UI system  in  the 
light of this research. 
WHAT ARE WORK 
DISINCENTIVE EFFECTS? 
Ever  since  the  program's  inception,  UI 
benefits  have  been  designed  with  two  basic 
objectives  directly  related  to the  unemployed 
worker.  First,  on  the  assumption  that  the 
worker  was  involuntarily  unemployed  for  a 
short  period,  benefits  were  established  to 
replace  a  portion  of  his  lost  wages.  Second, 
benefits were to go only to "regular" workers, 
and  could  not  be set  at so  high  a  level  as  to 
make  the  receipt  of  benefits  more  attractive 
than working. 
The difficulty  with  the second  objective  lies 
in  that  the  desirability  of  working,  or  the 
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acceptability of a particular job, is affected by a 
large  number  of  economic  and  noneconomic 
factors.  On  the  noneconomic  side,  "some 
workers  are choosier  than  others  about  jobs. 
Some place a higher value on spending time at 
home with their families than do others.  And 
the  psychic  costs  of  being  unemployed  are 
higher  for  some  workers  than  for   other^."^ 
Economically,  the  important  question  is  how 
costly  is  unemployment  and  what  alternative 
assets  and  income  sources  are  available?  If 
other things are equal, the better a worker can 
afford to be  unemployed, "the less effort he is 
likely to devote to searching for a  job and the 
more selective he is  likely to be about the kind 
of  job he will  a~cept."~ 
The  UI system  can  be  said  to  have  work 
disincentive effects to the extent that it results 
in  a voluntary reduction in  the supply of  labor 
in  the economy.  For example, an unemployed 
worker  might  turn  down  as  unsuitable  a  job 
which,  in  the absence of  UI,  he  would  have  - 
accepted. Similarly, a worker, knowing that his 
plant will  be closing, might delay searching for 
a job in  the knowledge that he can depend on 
UI benefits when  he decides to search.  Unlike 
collecting  benefits  under  the pretense  of 
seeking work, however, neither of these acts is 
illegal  nor  constitutes  fraud.  Furthermore, to 
the extent that additional job search  results in 
higher  paying,  more  stable  employment,  the 
work  disincentive  effects  might  prove  to have 
net positive res~lts.~  Whether or not these work 
disincentive effects should  be discouraged 
depends, then, on their relative mix of negative 
and positive effects. Determining the net effect, 
3 Raymond  Munts  and  Irwin  Garfinkel,  The  Work 
Disincentive  Effects  of  Unemployment  Insurance 
(Kalamazoo:  The  W. E.  Upjohn  Institute,  September 
1974), p. 56. 
4 Ibid.. p. 56. 
5 See Steven  P. Zell, "Recent Developments in The Theory 
of  Unemployment," Federal Reserve  Bank of  Kansas City 
Monthly Review.  September-October  1975,  pp. 5-6, for a 
discuss~on of  the  job-search,  labor-turnover  theory  of 
unemployment. 
however,  is  not  simple.  For  example,  though 
UI  benefits  lower  the  cost  of  search,  they 
simultaneously  lower  the  cost  of  increased 
leisure which might well be substituted for both 
work  and  job  search.  Secondly,  even  if 
additional  job  search  does  result  in  more 
pleasant  or  higher  paying  jobs,  the 
subsidization  of  individual  searchers  can  be 
justified  only  if  it  can  be  shown  that  an 
improved job match constitutes some benefit to 
society which does not simultaneously accrue to 
the individual searcher.  Otherwise, the worker 
would be likely to search the optimum amount 
in the absence of s~bsidies.~ 
THE CENTER OF THE CONTROVERSY 
While  some  research  had  been  done 
previously on the unintended effects of  the UI 
system, by far the greatest impact has resulted 
from  the  findings  of  Professor  Martin  S. 
Feldstein  of  Harvard  University.  In  a  study 
prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of 
Congress in September 1973, and reiterated in 
numerous  professional  and  popular  articles 
since  that time,  Feldstein  concluded  that  the 
unemployment  insurance  system  was  respon- 
sible  for  a  significant  part  of  the  observed 
unemployment in the United  States.'  Much of 
the research that has been conducted since that 
6 Kathleen  Classen,  The  Effect  of  Unemployment 
Insurance  on  the  Duration  of  Unemployment  and 
Subsequent Earnings. The Public Research Institute of the 
Center for Naval  Analyses, September 1975, p. 1. 
Martin  S.  Feldstein.  Lowering  The  Permanent  Rate  of 
Unemployment.  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Econonlic 
Committee, 92nd Congress.  2nd  Session,  September  1973 
(Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1973). 
Feldstein  originally  presented  these  views  in  hearings 
before the Joint Economic Committee, 92nd Congress.  2nd 
Session  in  1972,  published  as "Policies  to  Lower  the 
Permanent  Rate  of  Unemployment."  See  also  "The 
Economics  of  the  New  Unemployment,"  The  Public 
Interest.  No.  33,  Fall  1973,  pp.  28-42.  "Unemployment 
Compensation: Adverse Incentives and Distributional 
Anomalies," National  Tax Journal,  Vol.  27.  No.  2.  June 
1974.  pp.  231-44,  and "Unemployment  Insurance:  Time 
for Reform," Harvard  Business Review. March-April 1974. 
pp. 51-61. 
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date on the UI system  has been an attempt to 
either support or contradict Feldstein's findings 
and methodology. 
Feldstein's Research 
Feldstein  begins  his  analysis  with  a 
discussion of  the major characteristics of 
unemployment  in  the  United  States  during 
nonrecessionary  times.  First,  the  duration  of 
unemployment is quite short.  For example, in 
1973,  when  the  unemployment  rate  was  a 
relatively high 4.9 per cent, more than half  of 
the unemployed  were without jobs for less than 
5  weeks  and  less  than  8  per  cent  were 
unemployed  for  more than 30 weeks.  Second, 
job losers account for less than half of  all  the 
unemployed,  the  remainder  consisting  of  job 
quitters,  new  entrants,  and  reentrants  to the 
labor force. Third, turnover is extremely  high, 
especially in manufacturing, where "total 
hirings and separations have each exceeded 4% 
of  the labor force  per month for  more than a 
decade.  Lastly,  most  layoffs  are  brief  and 
temporary.  The  average  manufacturing 
company rehires about 85 per cent of  those it 
lays off. 
All  of  these  factors  are very  important  for 
understanding the effects of  the UI  system on 
unemployment.  Consider,  for  example,  the 
duration of  unemployment. The total  amount 
of  unemployment  in  the economy  is  the  sum 
over all individuals of the number of times they 
are  unemployed  multiplied  by  the  average 
duration  of  their  spells  of  unemployment. 
Therefore, unemployment can be increased  by 
either  increasing  the  number  of  spells  of 
unemployment  or  lengthening the duration  of 
the spells. Feldstein stresses that, in a variety of 
ways,  unemployment  insurance  has  both  of 
these effects. 
The Effects of  UI on the Structure 
of  Employment 
According to Feldstein,  the negative  aspects 
of  UI affect  not  only  the  unemployed  worker 
but the structure of  employment  as  well.  UI 
benefits  are financed  by  a  payroll  tax  which 
tends to vary with the amount of labor turnover 
of  the particular  firm.  However,  because  this 
"experience rating" system is imperfect, former 
employees  of  firms  with  high  turnover  can 
receive UI benefits well in excess of the tax cost 
to the firm.9  This creates an incentive for both 
employers  and  employees  to  structure 
employment with  too much  seasonal  and 
cyclical variation and too many casual jobs.  It 
has  this  effect  because  the  net  wage  to 
employees (wages plus unemployment  benefits) 
exceeds  the  cost  to employers. "Because  the 
price  of  unstable  labor  has  been  artificially 
subsidized, employers organize production in a 
way  that  makes  too  much  use  of  unstable 
employment. Similarly, the economy as a whole 
consumes relatively too much of the goods that 
are produced in  this way," because the prices 
of these goods are artifically low.'O 
Likewise, workers  may be induced  to accept 
seasonal,  cyclical,  or  temporary  jobs,  even 
knowing they are likely to be laid off, because 
they know that unemployment  benefits will  be 
available to supplement their lost income. The 
net effect is the preservation and expansion  of 
the secondary sector of the dual labor market, 
with  its  low  wages,  poor  working  conditions, 
layoffs, little chance for advancement, and high 
turnover. ' 
In  the absence of  unemployment  compensa- 
tion, most  workers could be induced  to accept 
unstable  work  only  if  the  wages  were 
sufficiently higher than those in available stable 
employment so as to compensate for the greater 
probability of becoming unemployed. Similarly. 
if  employers  had  to  pay  the  full  cost  of  UI 
benefits, they would  tend to incur the expense 
8 Feldstein, Harvard  Business Review. p. 53. 
9 Zell, "Unemployment  Insurance Part  I," pp. 13,  16-17, 
footnote  18, and discussion later in the present article. 
Feldstein, The Publrc Interest.  p. 34. 
11 See  Zell,  "Recent  Developments  in  The  Theory  of 
Unemployment," pp. 7-10. 
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of  improved scheduling, greater inventory 
variability,  more  off-season  work,  and  new 
technology  so  as  to  reduce  the  instability  of 
employment. Finally, consumer demand for the 
output of these firms would fall as their prices 
rose, further reducing the amount of  unstable 
employment. 
The Effects of  UI on the 
Duration of  Unemployment 
The  second  side  of  Feldstein's  argument 
pertains  to  the  work  disincentive  effects  of 
unemployment compensation. Feldstein dismis- 
ses  as  a  myth  the  often cited  figure  that  UI 
benefits  replace,  on  the  average,  about 
one-third  of  lost  weekly  wages.  The  flaw  in 
these data, he notes, is that they ignore the fact 
that wages are taxed while UI benefits are not. 
Taking  into  consideration  Federal  and  state 
income  taxes  and  the  Social  Security  tax, 
Feldstein  found  in  his initial research that UI 
benefits  in  the  state  of  Massachusetts  for  a 
family of four would  replace more than 80 per 
cent of the wages lost from an additional  week 
of  unemployment.  Under  some  special 
circumstances,  the  wage  replacement  figure 
might even exceed 100 per cent. 
Criticized on the grounds that Massachusetts 
was an atypical state, Feldstein calculated wage 
replacement  ratios  for  all  states  and  for  13 
different family  types.  His  findings  confirmed 
his initial results. Men and women with median 
earnings  for  their  state  were  entitled  to 
unemployment  benefits  which  replaced, 
respectively, over 60 per cent and over  70 per 
cent  of  lost  weekly  after-tax  wages. 
Furthermore, the income replacement effect  is 
greater  for  those  persons  with  lower-than- 
average earnings; e.g., men and women whose 
income was only 70 per cent of  the median for 
their state had replacement rates of 69 per cent 
and 78 per cent, respectively. 
Similar calculations for Kansas City, Mo., in 
1975 also confirm  Feldstein's  findings  (Table 
1).  In  each of  four  cases,  a  married  worker, 
earning either $3, $4, $5, or $6  per hour, was 
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assumed to have two dependent children and a 
nonworking spouse.  Consider  the worker  who 
earned  $3  per  hour.  If  he  worked  52  weeks 
during the year,  his  gross wage income would 
have been $6,240. Had he been unemployed for 
13  weeks, this would  have dropped to $4,680, 
yielding  a  loss  of  $1,560.  This,  however, 
represents  his  lost  gross  wages.  Taking  into 
consideration  his reduced  liability  for Federal, 
state,  and  local  income  taxes  and  the Social 
Security  tax,  the  amount  of  lost  net  wages 
would  total  only  $1,211.  His  UI  benefit 
entitlement  of  $1,014  for  13  weeks  of 
unemployment  would  therefore replace 84  per 
cent of this net wage loss yielding a net income 
loss of only $197. Looked at another way, since 
working  an extra  13  weeks  yields  the worker 
$1,560 of  additional  gross  income,  but  only 
$197 of additional net income, the implicit tax 
rate  on  this  extra  work  is  87  per  cent.  By 
staying  unemployed  13  weeks  rather  than  12 
weeks,  the  worker  would  actually  lose  only 
$15.20, or $0.38 per hour. 
Distributional and Unemployment Effects 
Feldstein  uses  his  results  to  examine  two 
important questions:  (1) What  groups  in  the 
population  benefit  most  from  the  present 
structure of  UI benefits? and  (2) What are the 
total effects on unemployment of the distortions 
introduced by UI? 
On  this second  question,  Feldstein  provides 
some  rough  estimates of  the  magnitudes  that 
might be involved. 
For example, a  reduction of  three weeks 
in  the average  ten-week  spell  of  insured 
unemployment  would  lower  the  overall 
unemployment  rate by  0.75  [percentage 
points]. If one-third of the purely seasonal 
unemployment  were  avoided,  the overall 
unemployment  rate  would  fall  by  an 
additional  0.25  [percentage  points]. 
Reducing  the cyclical  variation  in  labor 
demand  by  20%  would  reduce  average 
unemployment  by  another  0.25  [per- 
centage points]. '' 
Given  a  labor  force  of  almost  94  million 
persons,  these changes could  represent  a 
decrease in  unemployment  of  almost  1.2 
million persons. l3 
Regarding the first question,  if  it were true 
that the poor are the greatest  beneficiaries of 
UI benefits, some of the distortions introduced 
by  the  system  might  be  justified.  Unfortu- 
nately, this is not the  case. In a study using 1970 
data,  Feldstein  discovered  that, "Half  of  the 
benefits go to the families in the top half of the 
income  distribution.  Fifteen  per  cent  of  the 
benefits . . . went to the 18  per cent of families 
with incomes over $20,000. Only 17 per cent of 
the  benefits  went  to  families  with  incomes 
under $5,000."14  Some of the reasons given for 
these  surprising  facts  pertain  to the  different 
employment  characteristics  of  poor  workers 
relative to those with higher incomes, as well as 
to the basic structure of  the UI system.  When 
unemployed,  poor  workers  are  more  likely  to 
have  quit  their  last  job,  to  have  worked  too 
little to earn sufficient wage credits, or to have 
worked  in  employment  not  covered  by  the UI 
system. Even when qualifying for benefits, poor 
workers will frequently qualify for less than the 
maximum duration and will more often exhaust 
their  benefits.  Middle  and  higher  income 
workers,  on  the  other  hand,  will  be  entitled 
to  higher  benefits,  will  more  often  have  two 
wage earners in  a  family,  thus  increasing  the 
risk of unemployment, and be more likely to be 
laid  off  only  temporarily and  recalled  by  the 
same firm. 
In  addition  to  the  fact  that  middle  and 
higher  income  workers  receive  a  dispro- 
12 Feldstein,  Hurvurd Business Review, p. 58. 
13 The  research  of  Stephen  Marston  and  of  Kathleen 
Classen, discussed  below,  presents alternative  inter- 
pretations  and estimates of these changes. 
14 Feldstein, Nutionul  Tux Journal. p. 237. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas C~ty Unemployment lnsurance 
portionate  share  of  UI  benefits,  a  further 
distortion is  added by the tax system. Because 
higher income families are in higher income-tax 
brackets, the tax savings resulting from the fact 
that UI benefits are not taxed go far more than 
proportionately to these higher income families. 
Thus, while 29 per cent of  all families earned 
over $15,000 in 1970, they received 34 per cent 
of the UI tax savings.  On the other  hand, the 
28 per cent of all families with  incomes below 
$5,000  received  only  15 per  cent  of  the  tax 
savings. Is 
If  unemployment  benefits  were  taxed  as 
income,  the Government  would  receive about 
$1  billion  in  additional  revenue  (in 
nonrecessionary  periods) and  part of  the 
regressivity of  UI  benefits  would  be  reversed. 
Furthermore, the work disincentive effect of UI 
payments  would  be  somewhat  reduced.  For 
example, in Kansas City, Mo., the effective tax 
rate on  the income  earned  by accepting a  job 
after 12 weeks of  unemployment rather than 13 
weeks would drop from 87 per cent to 76  per 
cent for the worker earning $3 per hour, if  UI 
benefits were taxable. 
RESOLVING THE CONTROVERSY 
While  many  of  Feldstein's  findings 
pertaining to disincentive effects on individuals 
and firms are intuitively persuasive, his claims 
for  their  magnitude,  especially  in  the 
aggregate, have  been  extensively debated. 
Much  of  the  early  criticism  of  his  research, 
however, was based  more on differing views of 
the structure and operation of the labor market 
than on contradictory empirical results.16 
The  two  most  important  criticisms  were, 
first,  that there was  little evidence confirming 
the significant effect of the UI system on either 
the duration  of  unemployment or the amount 
'5 Ibid. 
16 See  Comments  by  R.  A. Gordon,  Bennett  Harrison, 
Charles C. Holt, Hyman Kaitz, and Frank C. Pierson, and 
Feldstein's  reply  in  Feldstein,  Lowering  the  Permanent 
Rate of' Unemployment, pp. 56-101. 
of seasonal, cyclical, or unstable employment in 
the economy.  Second, it was argued, whatever 
effects there were on  unemployment  duration, 
they would be unlikely to be of such magnitude 
as  to  significantly  affect  the  overall 
unemployment  rate. While data problems 
continue, especially regarding the effects of  UI 
on  the  structure  of  employment,  recent 
research has greatly clarified the duration issue 
and other important questions  about the 
impact of the UI system. 
Recent Research on Duration 
In a 1975 study for the Brookings Institution, 
Stephen T. Marston developed  a sophisticated 
model for estimating the effects of  UI benefits 
on  the  duration  of  unemploy~nent.'~  Like 
Feldstein,  Marston  compared  the duration  of 
unemployment  of  insured  and ' uninsured 
workers,  hoping  to  estimate  the  disincentive 
effects  of  UI  benefits.  Correctly  criticizing 
Feldstein  for  misinterpreting  published 
duration  data,  Marston  adjusted  these  data 
through  a  complex  procedure  which  he 
hypothesized would yield more accurate results. 
In  this  manner,  Marston calculated  that 
unemployment  insurance  lengthens  the 
expected duration of  completed  spells  of 
unemployment for the insured by between 15.7 
per cent and  31.4  per cent.  The net  effect  of 
this, according to Marston, would  be  to raise 
the overall unemployment rate by about 0.2 to 
0.3  percentage  points.  This  contrasts  with 
Feldstein's  rough  estimate that the unemploy- 
ment rate might be lowered by 0.75 percentage 
points by reducing the effect of  UI benefits on 
unemployment duration. 
Numerous  problems  exist,  however,  in 
interpreting  Marston's  results.  The  most 
important of these problems is  inherent in any 
comparison of insured  and uninsured  workers. 
Basically,  most  insured  unemployed  workers 
17 Stephen  T.  Marston, "The  Impact  of  Unemployment 
Insurance on Job Search." Brookings  Papers  on Economic 
Activity.  1975: 1. 
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are  job  losers.  On the  other  hand,  the 
uninsured  unemployed  have  either  quit,  been 
fired  for  misconduct,  are  new  entrants  or 
reentrants to the labor force,  have  not earned 
sufficient wage credits, or worked in uncovered 
employment.  Furthermore, even  the job  loser 
group  studied  is  a  special  group  of  such 
workers,  since  many job  losers  never  become 
unemployed  at  all.  Thus,  besides  the 
adjustments  made by  Marston  to compensate 
for the differing demographic characteristics of 
the two groups, it is extremely difficult, if  not 
impossible,  to disentangle  behavioral  dif- 
ferences due to being an insured  worker from 
those due to being a job loser.I8 
Other  difficulties also  exist  with  Marston's 
study. Because of problems with the restrictive 
nature of available data, Marston was required 
to use extremely "complex and often  arbitrary 
techniques [to]  circumvent  these  pr~blems.'"~ 
As a  consequence,  it  is  difficult  to assess  the 
accuracy  of  his  results  or  to  interpret  their 
meaning. For example, by adjusting for factors 
allegedly  omitted  by  Marston,  Feldstein 
deduces from  Marston's  figures  that UI, 
operating  solely  through  extended  duration, 
causes  an  increase  of  0.69  percentage  points 
in  the overall  unemployment  rate.20  Similarly, 
Hall  notes  that  other  findings  of  Marston's 
show that right after  exhausting  benefits,  the 
rate  of  leaving  unemployment  rises  rapidly. 
"Part of that increase clearly consists of  people 
who  leave  the  labor  force,  but  part  clearly 
consists of those who take jobs. If every insured 
worker  were  delaying  his  exit  from 
unemployment  to  the  same  degree  as, 
18 See  Comments  by  Robert  C. Hall, pp.  51-52  and  by 
Feldstein,  pp. 52-58 in Marston, "The Impact . . . ".  Both 
give several reasons why job losers would  be likely to suffer 
shorter  periods  of  joblessness  than  other  unemployed 
workers.  irrespective  of  UI  benefits.  If  this  is  true, then 
Marston's study underestimates the true insured-uninsured 
durat~on  differential. 
19 Kathleen Classen, p. 11, and Feldstein, Comments, pp. 
54-56. 
20 Feldstein. Comments, pp. 54-55. 
apparently, do those who have exhausted their 
benefits,  unemployment  insurance  would  be 
lengthening  unemployment  s~bstantially."~' 
Marston does make the excellent  point that in 
an  economy  with  limited  employment 
opportunities,  shortening  the  unemployment 
duration  of  some  workers  by  eliminating  UI 
might well result in the displacement of  other 
workers, thus reducing the aggregate effect on 
unemployment.  Nevertheless,  it  appears  that 
there are more fruitful approaches that can be 
taken to examine the duration issue. 
One  such  approach  is  found  in  a  study 
conducted  by  Kathleen  Classen  of  the  Public 
Research  Institute  of  the  Center  for  Naval 
Analyses.  For  her  study,  Classen  had  the 
advantage of a body of data which permits the 
examination  within  a  single  state  of  similar 
individuals  who  receive  different  benefit 
amounts.  In  Pennsylvania,  benefits  were 
significantly  increased  in  1968  only  for  those 
workers  earning  above  a  specified  level.  By 
examining a sample of  claimants who filed the 
year before and the year after the change in the 
benefit schedule, Classen was  able to estimate 
the  effects  of  an  increase  in  weekly  benefit 
amount  (WBA)  on  the  duration  of 
unemployment  while  avoiding  many  of  the 
pitfalls inherent in  other data sources.22 
Looking  first  at  aggregate  data,  Classen 
found  a  significant  rise  in  the  duration  of 
unemployment  for  that  group  of  individuals 
entitled to a WBA  increase (of $15 from $45 to 
$65).  On  the  other  hand,  those  claimants 
entitled  to  only  a  very  small  benefit  increase 
experienced an actual decline in  unemployment 
duration. Studying the data through regression 
analysis  confirmed  these  initial  findings. 
Specifically, a $10 increase in  WBA  resulted in 
a  1.1  week  increase  in  the  average 
21 Hall. Comments. p. 50. 
22 In  an  appendix  to  her  Pennsylvania  work,  Classen 
examined similar data for Arizona and obtained strikingly 
similar  results despite  major  d~fferences  between  the  UI 
systems of the two states. 
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unemployment  duration  of  all  claimants. 
Furthermore, when  persons  who were recalled 
by  their former employers were excluded  from 
the  sample  (on  the  grounds  that  their 
unemployment duration was largely determined 
by  their employer  and  thus not  a  function  of 
their  WBA),  the  length  of  time  by  which 
duration  was extended  by  a  $10 rise in  WBA 
climbed to 1.6 weeks. If these relationships are 
applicable to the nation as a whole they would 
imply  that  a  $10  increase  in  WBA  for  all 
covered  workers  would  have  increased  the 
unemployment rate for these workers by about 
0.6  percentage  points,  a  very  large 
increase. 23 
Other Research 
Several researchers,  including  Classen, have 
examined  the  related  question  of  whether 
increased UI benefits result in longer and more 
productive job search,  and, thereby, in  better 
worker-job matches. If this is the case, it might 
be argued  that the benefits  deriving to society 
from  improved  job  matches  would  more  than 
compensate  for  the  increased  duration  of 
unemployment.  24 Four papers dealing with this 
issue were presented at the Symposium on  the 
Economics  of  Unemployment  Insurance,  held 
at  the  University  of  Pittsburgh  on  April  8-9, 
1976.25  The basic question examined  by  these 
papers  was  whether  there  was  a  positive 
23 Including the  SUA program (see Part  II), over 90  per 
cent of the labor force is employed in or unemployed from 
covered  industries.  While  there  are  some  econometric 
problems with Classen's  methodology,  it  appears that  her 
findings are of the right order of magnitude. 
24 As noted on page 15, however, subsidization ofjob search 
can  be  justified  only  if  the  benefits  to  society  from  this 
increased  search  do  not  simultaneously  accrue  to  the 
searcher  who  would  otherwise  be  likely  to  search  the 
optimum amount in the absence of subsidies. 
25 Kathleen  Classen.  "Effects . . . "; Jerry  L.  Kingston 
and  Paul  L.  Burgess,  "Unemployment  Insurance  and 
Earnings  Changes  From  the  Preunemployment  to  the 
Postunemployment  Year";  Arlene  Holen,  "Effects  of 
Unemployment Insurance Entitlement on Duration and Job 
Search  Outcome"; and  Ronald G.  Ehrenberg and  Ronald 
L.  Oaxaca, "Unemployment Insurance, Duration  of 
Unemployment,  and Subsequent  Wage Gain." 
relationship  between  UI  benefits  and, 
presumably as a result of increased job search, 
post-unemployment wages. The results ranged 
from  no  (Classen),  to  strongly  yes  for  older 
men (Ehrenberg - Oaxaca). 
In an incisive commentary  on  these papers, 
however,  Professor  Finis  Welch  of  UCLA 
showed that none of  the studies  really  proved 
its  case.16  During  the  examination  of  data 
provided  by  the  "real"  world,  econometric 
difficulties combine with institutional factors to 
enormously  complicate  the  estimation  pro- 
cedure.  For  example,  state  benefit  formulas 
determine  a  claimant's  WBA  as  a  direct 
function of his pre-unemployment wages, Thus, 
by  trying to find  a  relationship  between  WBA 
and post-unemployment wages, one is  actually 
estimating  the  relationship  between  pre-  and 
post-unemployment  wages.  Not  surprisingly, 
this  relationship  is  strong  and  positive.  This 
finding, however,  reveals  little  about  the 
relationship between UI benefits and job-search 
productivity.  Furthermore,  Welch  noted,  the 
fact that employers must initially pay (through 
higher taxes) for  increased  UI  benefits  could 
very well lower, over  time, the entire schedule 
of  wages employers  are willing to offer.  Since 
both pre- and post-unemployment wages could 
be lowered  by  increasing  UI benefits  (though 
not  necessarily  to  the  same  degree),  a 
theoretical  case  can  be  made  for  either  a 
positive or a  negative  relationship  between  UI 
benefits  and  post-unemployme~t  wages. 
Whatever the results, however, they would yield 
no clear information on the productivity of  job 
search.  It appears, therefore,  that much  more 
work  must  be  done  before  a  definite 
relationship  between  UI  benefits  and 
productive job search can be determined. 
In  addition  to the  above  questions,  many 
other  important  UI  issues  have  yet  to  be 
examined  in  depth.  Frank  Brechling  has 
26 Finis Welch, "What Have We Learned From  Empirical 
Studies of Unemployment  Insurance?", unpublished  paper 
presented at the Symposium. 
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conducted  an  extensive  theoretical  study 
designed  to discover  the  incentive  effects  on 
individual  firms  of  the  unemployment 
insurance tax as it  currently operates in  most 
~tates.~'  Brechling theorizes, for example, that 
the structure of  the current experience  rating 
system  of  UI  taxation  affects  the hiring  and 
layoff policies of firms in a complicated manner 
with potentially strong policy implications. The 
actual  magnitude  of  these  effects,  however, 
remains to be estimated. 
A  related  issue  is  that of  determining  who 
ultimately  pays  the  tax  cost  of  financing 
unemployment insurance. While employers 
initially  pay the UI  payroll  tax,  it  is  unlikely 
that they absorb all of  the cost.  Some of  it  is 
certainly passed on to consumers in the form of 
higher prices.  In addition,  much of  it  may be 
indirectly paid  by  labor  in  the form  of  lower 
wage offers made by employers, substitution  of 
capital  for  labor  in  some  processes,  and  the 
reluctance  of  employers  to  hire  from  groups 
with a history of high turnover.28  Furthermore, 
because  some  industries  have  very  high 
turnover  while  others  have  very  stable 
employment,  there  is  an  implicit  cross-subsi- 
dization  among  industries  and  a  potential 
distortion in  the use of  the nation's  resources. 
The issues involved in these and other questions 
are very complicated, however, and much more 
theoretical  and  empirical  work  must  be  done 
before  the  magnitude  of  the  effects  can  be 
estimated  and  the  related  policy  implications 
assessed. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In  this final article of  a  three-part series  on 
unemployment  insurance,  some  of  the 
2'  Frank  Brechling, "The  Incentive  Effects  of  the  U.S. 
Unemployment  Insurance Tax," PRI 173-75,  June 1975, 
and "Unemployment  Insurance  Taxes  and  Labor 
Turnover:  Summary of  Theoretical  Findings," PRI  75-5, 
December 1975. Public Research  Institute. 
28 For a  preliminary  theoretical  study  of  this  issue,  see 
Charles E. McLure, Jr., "The Incidence of the Financing of 
Unemployment  Insurance,"  unpublished  paper,  Depart- 
ment of  Economics, Rice University. 
important  issues  regarding  the  unintended 
effects  of  the UI system  have  been examined. 
Ever  since  the  inception  of  the  system, 
economists  have  been  concerned  that  the 
payment  of  UI  benefits  might  result  in  a 
reduction  of  work  effort  or in an increase  in 
unemployment  duration.  This  possibility  was 
recently  highlighted  by  Martin  Feldstein  of 
Harvard University. 
In his controversial  1972  congressional 
testimony, Feldstein illustrated how UI benefits 
replace most of the after-tax income that is lost 
from  being  unemployed.  Feldstein  also  noted 
that  because  the  system  permits  workers  to 
receive  benefits  in  excess  of  the cost  to their 
former  employers,  an  excessive  amount  of 
seasonal,  cyclical,  and temporary  employment 
is encouraged. Much of the research done since 
then  has  attempted  to  either  support  or 
contradict Feldstein's findings and methodology. 
Of the issues involved in  the UI controversy, 
the one receiving the closest scrutiny.'  has  been 
the  effect  of  UI  on  the  durat'ion  of 
unemployment.  While  Feldstein suggested  the 
potential  for  such  an  effect,  he'  never 
accurately  estimated  its  magnitude.  Recent 
research, especially that studying the 'marginal 
effect on duration of increasing benefits,, seems 
to indicate that UI  benefits are responsible for 
a  sizable  increase  in  the  du.ration  of 
unemployment of the insured unempl.oyed. 
On  the  question  of  whether  this  extended 
unemployment duration is  spent in  eoductive 
job search  (yielding higher post-unemployment 
wages), the  results  are  unclear.  A  theoretical 
case can be made for expecting either a positive 
or  a  negative  relationship  between  unemploy- 
ment  benefits  and  post-unemployment  wages. 
Furthermore, the  very  formulas  by  which  UI 
benefit  levels  are  determined  (i.e., based  on 
pre-unemployment  wages)  may  make  the 
empirical  estimation  of  this  relationship 
impossible  using  available  data.  Clearly,  new 
experiments  will  have  to  be  developed  to deal 
with  this issue. 
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A  complete  revision  of  a  popular  special  study. 
International  Trade  and  American  Agriculture,  has  been 
completed by the staff of the Research Division of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The new booklet is designed to 
assist interested individuals to understand the policy issues at 
stake in  expanding international  trade in  agricultural 
products. 
The booklet provides a historical perspective of agricultural 
trade, examines  the  programs  that  have  been  designed  for 
increasing exports, reviews the current status of international 
trade, and discusses the agricultural  iniplications of  current 
international trade negotiations. 
Copies  of  the  booklet  are  available  from  the  Research 
Division, Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City. Kansas City. 
Missouri  64  198. 